Using mount flag `MS_NOSUID` also affects SELinux domain transitions but
this has not been documented well.
Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
With a simple backslash, '\0' ended up as ' ' in the man output.
Reported-by: Štěpán Němec <stepnem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
No implementation or spec requires *n to be 0 to allocate a new buffer:
* musl checks for !*lineptr
(and sets *n=0 for later allocations)
* glibc checks for !*lineptr || !*n
(but only because it allocates early)
* NetBSD checks for !*lineptr
(and sets *n=0 for later allocations)
(but specifies *n => mlen(*lineptr) >= *n as a precondition,
to which this appears to be an exception)
* FreeBSD checks for !*lineptr and sets *n=0
(and specifies !*lineptr as sufficient)
* Lastly, POSIX.1-2017 specifies:
> If *n is non-zero, the application shall ensure that *lineptr
> either points to an object of size at least *n bytes,
> or is a null pointer.
The new wording matches POSIX, even if it arrives at the point slightly
differently
Signed-off-by: Ahelenia Ziemiańska <nabijaczleweli@nabijaczleweli.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Don't document includes that provide types; only those that
provide prototypes and constants.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
The types that need <sys/types.h> are better documented in
system_data_types(7). Let's keep only the includes for the
prototypes and the constants.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
'struct iovec' is defined in <bits/types/struct_iovec.h>,
which is included by <sys/io.h>, but it is also included by
<bits/fcntl-linux.h>, which is in the end included by <fcntl.h>.
Given that we already include <fcntl.h>, we don't need any more
includes.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
'struct utimbuf' is provided by <utime.h>.
There's no need for <sys/types.h>.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
<sys/types.h> makes no sense for a function that only uses 'int'.
The flags used by this function are provided by <fcntl.h>
(or others), but not by <linux/userfaultfd.h>.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
'mode_t', which is the only reason this might have been ever
needed, is provided by <sys/stat.h> since POSIX.1-2001.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
'off_t', which is the only reason this might have been ever
needed, is provided by <unistd.h> since POSIX.1-2001.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
There seems to be no reason to include <unistd.h>.
<sys/swap.h> already provides both the function prototypes and the
SWAP_* constants.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
<unistd.h> doesn't seem to be needed:
AT_* constants come from <fcntl.h>
STATX_* constants come from <sys/stat.h>
'struct statx' comes from <sys/stat.h>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Remove <sys/types.h>; ffix too
<sys/types.h> is only needed for 'struct stat'.
That is better documented in system_data_types(7).
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
A function declarator with empty parentheses, which is not a
prototype, is an obsolescent feature of C (See C17 6.11.6.1), and
doesn't mean 0 parameters, but instead that no information about
the parameters is provided (See C17 6.5.2.2).
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
It's only needed for getting 'mode_t'.
But that type is better documented in system_data_types(7).
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Doing so decreases the degree to which text is indented, and
thus avoids short, poorly wrapped lines.
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Quoting Jann Horn:
[[
As discussed at
<https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez0m4Y24ZBZCh+Tf4ORMm9_q4n7VOzpGjwGF7_Fe8EQH=Q@mail.gmail.com>,
we need to re-check checkNotificationIdIsValid() after reading remote
memory but before using the read value in any way. Otherwise, the
syscall could in the meantime get interrupted by a signal handler, the
signal handler could return, and then the function that performed the
syscall could free() allocations or return (thereby freeing buffers on
the stack).
In essence, this pread() is (unavoidably) a potential use-after-free
read; and to make that not have any security impact, we need to check
whether UAF read occurred before using the read value. This should
probably be called out elsewhere in the manpage, too...
Now, of course, **reading** is the easy case. The difficult case is if
we have to **write** to the remote process... because then we can't
play games like that. If we write data to a freed pointer, we're
screwed, that's it. (And for somewhat unrelated bonus fun, consider
that /proc/$pid/mem is originally intended for process debugging,
including installing breakpoints, and will therefore happily write
over "readonly" private mappings, such as typical mappings of
executable code.)
So, uuuuh... I guess if anyone wants to actually write memory back to
the target process, we'd better come up with some dedicated API for
that, using an ioctl on the seccomp fd that magically freezes the
target process inside the syscall while writing to its memory, or
something like that? And until then, the manpage should have a big fat
warning that writing to the target's memory is simply not possible
(safely).
]]
and
<https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez0m4Y24ZBZCh+Tf4ORMm9_q4n7VOzpGjwGF7_Fe8EQH=Q@mail.gmail.com>:
[[
The second bit of trouble is that if the supervisor is so oblivious
that it doesn't realize that syscalls can be interrupted, it'll run
into other problems. Let's say the target process does something like
this:
int func(void) {
char pathbuf[4096];
sprintf(pathbuf, "/tmp/blah.%d", some_number);
mount("foo", pathbuf, ...);
}
and mount() is handled with a notification. If the supervisor just
reads the path string and immediately passes it into the real mount()
syscall, something like this can happen:
target: starts mount()
target: receives signal, aborts mount()
target: runs signal handler, returns from signal handler
target: returns out of func()
supervisor: receives notification
supervisor: reads path from remote buffer
supervisor: calls mount()
but because the stack allocation has already been freed by the time
the supervisor reads it, the supervisor just reads random garbage, and
beautiful fireworks ensue.
So the supervisor *fundamentally* has to be written to expect that at
*any* time, the target can abandon a syscall. And every read of remote
memory has to be separated from uses of that remote memory by a
notification ID recheck.
And at that point, I think it's reasonable to expect the supervisor to
also be able to handle that a syscall can be aborted before the
notification is delivered.
]]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Michael Kerrisk