access.2: ffix

Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>

man2/access.2

@@ -46,21 +46,21 @@ access, faccessat \- check user's permissions for a file
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .nf
 .B #include <unistd.h>
-.sp
+.PP
 .BI "int access(const char *" pathname ", int " mode );
 
 .BR "#include <fcntl.h>           " "/* Definition of AT_* constants */"
 .B #include <unistd.h>
-.sp
+.PP
 .BI "int faccessat(int " dirfd ", const char *" pathname ", int " \
 mode ", int " flags );
 .fi
-.sp
+.PP
 .in -4n
 Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see
 .BR feature_test_macros (7)):
 .in
-.sp
+.PP
 .BR faccessat ():
 .PD 0
 .ad l
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ checks whether the calling process can access the file
 If
 .I pathname
 is a symbolic link, it is dereferenced.
-
+.PP
 The
 .I mode
 specifies the accessibility check(s) to be performed,
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ tests for the existence of the file.
 .BR R_OK ", " W_OK ", and " X_OK
 test whether the file exists and grants read, write, and
 execute permissions, respectively.
-
+.PP
 The check is done using the calling process's
 .I real
 UID and GID, rather than the effective IDs as is done when
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ Similarly, for the root user, the check uses the set of
 permitted capabilities rather than the set of effective
 capabilities; and for non-root users, the check uses an empty set
 of capabilities.
-
+.PP
 This allows set-user-ID programs and capability-endowed programs
 to easily determine the invoking user's authority.
 In other words,
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ read/write/execute this file?",
 which gives set-user-ID programs the possibility to
 prevent malicious users from causing them to read files
 which users shouldn't be able to read.
-
+.PP
 If the calling process is privileged (i.e., its real UID is zero),
 then an
 .B X_OK
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The
 system call operates in exactly the same way as
 .BR access (),
 except for the differences described here.
-
+.PP
 If the pathname given in
 .I pathname
 is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the directory
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ referred to by the file descriptor
 the calling process, as is done by
 .BR access ()
 for a relative pathname).
-
+.PP
 If
 .I pathname
 is relative and
@@ -154,13 +154,13 @@ then
 is interpreted relative to the current working
 directory of the calling process (like
 .BR access ()).
-
+.PP
 If
 .I pathname
 is absolute, then
 .I dirfd
 is ignored.
-
+.PP
 .I flags
 is constructed by ORing together zero or more of the following values:
 .TP
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ library support was added to glibc in version 2.4.
 .SH CONFORMING TO
 .BR access ():
 SVr4, 4.3BSD, POSIX.1-2001, POSIX.1-2008.
-
+.PP
 .BR faccessat ():
 POSIX.1-2008.
 .SH NOTES
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ returns 0 for such files.
 .\" This behavior appears to have been an implementation accident.
 Early 2.6 kernels (up to and including 2.6.3)
 also behaved in the same way as kernel 2.4.
-
+.PP
 In kernels before 2.6.20,
 these calls ignored the effect of the
 .B MS_NOEXEC