From 4ba0bbdef50f4b939be1e123dacb1d209d0a6182 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Kerrisk Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2017 08:29:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] access.2: ffix Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk --- man2/access.2 | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/man2/access.2 b/man2/access.2 index cc818be10..fba2454d6 100644 --- a/man2/access.2 +++ b/man2/access.2 @@ -46,21 +46,21 @@ access, faccessat \- check user's permissions for a file .SH SYNOPSIS .nf .B #include -.sp +.PP .BI "int access(const char *" pathname ", int " mode ); .BR "#include " "/* Definition of AT_* constants */" .B #include -.sp +.PP .BI "int faccessat(int " dirfd ", const char *" pathname ", int " \ mode ", int " flags ); .fi -.sp +.PP .in -4n Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see .BR feature_test_macros (7)): .in -.sp +.PP .BR faccessat (): .PD 0 .ad l @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ checks whether the calling process can access the file If .I pathname is a symbolic link, it is dereferenced. - +.PP The .I mode specifies the accessibility check(s) to be performed, @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ tests for the existence of the file. .BR R_OK ", " W_OK ", and " X_OK test whether the file exists and grants read, write, and execute permissions, respectively. - +.PP The check is done using the calling process's .I real UID and GID, rather than the effective IDs as is done when @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ Similarly, for the root user, the check uses the set of permitted capabilities rather than the set of effective capabilities; and for non-root users, the check uses an empty set of capabilities. - +.PP This allows set-user-ID programs and capability-endowed programs to easily determine the invoking user's authority. In other words, @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ read/write/execute this file?", which gives set-user-ID programs the possibility to prevent malicious users from causing them to read files which users shouldn't be able to read. - +.PP If the calling process is privileged (i.e., its real UID is zero), then an .B X_OK @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The system call operates in exactly the same way as .BR access (), except for the differences described here. - +.PP If the pathname given in .I pathname is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the directory @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ referred to by the file descriptor the calling process, as is done by .BR access () for a relative pathname). - +.PP If .I pathname is relative and @@ -154,13 +154,13 @@ then is interpreted relative to the current working directory of the calling process (like .BR access ()). - +.PP If .I pathname is absolute, then .I dirfd is ignored. - +.PP .I flags is constructed by ORing together zero or more of the following values: .TP @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ library support was added to glibc in version 2.4. .SH CONFORMING TO .BR access (): SVr4, 4.3BSD, POSIX.1-2001, POSIX.1-2008. - +.PP .BR faccessat (): POSIX.1-2008. .SH NOTES @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ returns 0 for such files. .\" This behavior appears to have been an implementation accident. Early 2.6 kernels (up to and including 2.6.3) also behaved in the same way as kernel 2.4. - +.PP In kernels before 2.6.20, these calls ignored the effect of the .B MS_NOEXEC