man-pages/man7/capabilities.7

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.\" 6 Aug 2002 - Initial Creation
.\" Modified 2003-05-23, Michael Kerrisk, <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
.\" Modified 2004-05-27, Michael Kerrisk, <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
.\" 2004-12-08, mtk Added O_NOATIME for CAP_FOWNER
.\" FIXME Capabilities are actually per-thread.
.\"
.TH CAPABILITIES 7 2004-12-08 "Linux 2.6.9" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
.SH NAME
capabilities \- overview of Linux capabilities
.SH DESCRIPTION

For the purpose of performing permission checks,
traditional Unix implementations distinguish two categories of processes:
.I privileged
processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root),
and
.I unprivileged
processes (whose effective UID is non-zero).
Privileged processes bypass all kernel permission checks,
while unprivileged processes are subject to full permission
checking based on the process's credentials
(usually: effective UID, effective GID, and supplementary group list).

Starting with kernel 2.2, Linux provides an
(as yet incomplete) system of
.IR capabilities ,
which divide the privileges traditionally associated with superuser
into distinct units that can be independently enabled and disabled.
.SS Capabilities List

As at Linux 2.6.6, the following capabilities are implemented:
.TP
.B CAP_CHOWN
Allow arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs (see
.BR chown (2)).
.TP
.B CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
Bypass file read, write, and execute permission checks.
(DAC = "discretionary access control".)
.TP
.B CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
Bypass file read permission checks and
directory read and execute permission checks.
.TP
.B CAP_FOWNER
Bypass permission checks on operations that normally
require the file system UID of the process to match the UID of
the file (e.g.,
.BR chmod (2),
.BR utime (2)),
excluding those operations covered by the
.B CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
and
.BR CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH ;
set extended file attributes (see
.BR chattr (1))
on arbitrary files;
set Access Control Lists (ACLs) on arbitrary files;
ignore directory sticky bit on file deletion;
specify
.B O_NOATIME
for arbitrary files in
.BR open (2)
and
.BR fcntl (2).
.TP
.B CAP_FSETID
Don't clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits when a file is modified;
permit setting of the set-group-ID bit for a file whose GID does not match
the file system or any of the supplementary GIDs of the calling process.
.TP
.B CAP_IPC_LOCK
Permit memory locking
.RB ( mlock (2),
.BR mlockall (2),
.BR mmap (2),
.BR shmctl (2)).
.TP
.B CAP_IPC_OWNER
Bypass permission checks for operations on System V IPC objects.
.TP
.B CAP_KILL
Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see
.BR kill (2)).
This includes use of the KDSIGACCEPT ioctl.
.\" FIXME: CAP_KILL also an effect for threads + setting child
.\" 	   termination signal to other than SIGCHLD
.TP
.B CAP_LEASE
(Linux 2.4 onwards)  Allow file leases to be established on
arbitrary files (see
.BR fcntl (2)).
.TP
.B CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
Allow setting of the
.B EXT2_APPEND_FL
and
.B EXT2_IMMUTABLE_FL
.\" These attributes are now available on ext2, ext3, Reiserfs
extended file attributes (see
.BR chattr (1)).
.TP
.B CAP_MKNOD
(Linux 2.4 onwards)
Allow creation of special files using
.BR mknod (2).
.TP
.B CAP_NET_ADMIN
Allow various network-related operations
(e.g., setting privileged socket options,
enabling multicasting, interface configuration,
modifying routing tables).
.TP
.B CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
Allow binding to Internet domain reserved socket ports
(port numbers less than 1024).
.TP
.B CAP_NET_BROADCAST
(Unused)  Allow socket broadcasting, and listening multicasts.
.TP
.B CAP_NET_RAW
Permit use of RAW and PACKET sockets.
.\" Also various IP options and setsockopt(SO_BINDTODEVICE)
.TP
.B CAP_SETGID
Allow arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary GID list;
allow forged GID when passing socket credentials via Unix domain sockets.
.TP
.B CAP_SETPCAP
Grant or remove any capability in the caller's
permitted capability set to or from any other process.
.TP
.B CAP_SETUID
Allow arbitrary manipulations of process UIDs
.RB ( setuid (2),
.BR setreuid (2),
.BR setresuid (2),
.BR setfsuid (2));
allow forged UID when passing socket credentials via Unix domain sockets.
.\" FIXME: CAP_SETUID also an effect in exec()
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Permit a range of system administration operations including:
.BR quotactl (2),
.BR mount (2),
.BR umount (2),
.BR swapon (2) ,
.BR swapoff (2) ,
.BR sethostname (2),
.BR setdomainname (2),
.B IPC_SET
and
.B IPC_RMID
operations on arbitrary System V IPC objects;
perform operations on
.I trusted
and
.I security
Extended Attributes (see
.BR attr (5));
allow forged UID when passing socket credentials;
exceed
.I /proc/sys/fs/file-max
limit in system calls that open files (e.g.,
.BR accept (2),
.BR execve (2),
.BR open (2),
.BR pipe (2))
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_BOOT
Permit calls to
.BR reboot (2).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_CHROOT
Permit calls to
.BR chroot (2).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_MODULE
Allow loading and unloading of kernel modules;
allow modifications to capability bounding set (see
.BR init_module (2)
and
.BR delete_module (2)).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_NICE
Allow raising process nice value
.RB ( nice (2),
.BR setpriority (2))
and changing of the nice value for arbitrary processes;
allow setting of real-time scheduling policies for calling process,
and setting scheduling policies and priorities for arbitrary processes
.RB ( sched_setscheduler (2),
.BR sched_setparam (2));
set CPU affinity for arbitrary processes
.RB ( sched_setaffinity ()).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_PACCT
Permit calls to
.BR acct (2).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_PTRACE
Allow arbitrary processes to be traced using
.BR ptrace (2)
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_RAWIO
Permit I/O port operations
.RB ( iopl (2)
and
.BR ioperm (2));
access
.IT /proc/kcore .
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
Permit: use of reserved space on ext2 file systems;
.BR ioctl (2)
calls controlling ext3 journaling;
disk quota limits to be overridden;
resource limits to be increased (see
.BR setrlimit (2));
.B RLIMIT_NPROC
resource limit to be overridden;
.I msg_qbytes
limit for a message queue to be
raised above the limit in
.IR /proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb
(see
.BR msgop (2)
and
.BR msgctl (2).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_TIME
Allow modification of system clock
.RB ( settimeofday (2),
.BR stime (2),
.BR adjtimex (2));
allow modification of real-time (hardware) clock
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
Permit calls to
.BR vhangup (2).
.SS Process Capabilities
Each process has three capability sets containing zero or more
of the above capabilities:
.TP
.IR Effective :
the capabilities used by the kernel to
perform permission checks for the process.
.TP
.IR Permitted :
the capabilities that the process may assume
(i.e., a limiting superset for the effective and inheritable sets).
If a process drops a capability from its permitted set,
it can never re-acquire that capability (unless it execs a
set-UID-root program).
.TP
.IR Inherited :
the capabilities preserved across an
.BR execve (2).
.PP
In the current implementation, a process is granted all permitted and
effective capabilities (subject to the operation of the
capability bounding set described below)
when it execs a set-UID-root program,
or if a process with a real UID of zero execs a new program.
.PP
A child created via
.BR fork (2)
inherits copies of its parent's capability sets.
.PP
Using
.BR capset (2),
a process may manipulate its own capability sets, or, if it has the
.B CAP_SETPCAP
capability, those of another process.

.SS Capability bounding set
When a program is execed, the permitted and  effective capabities are ANDed
with the current value of the so-called
.IR "capability bounding set" ,
defined in the file
.IR /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound .
This parameter can be used to place a system-wide limit on the
capabilities granted to all subsequently executed programs.
(Confusingly, this bit mask parameter is expressed as a
signed decimal number in
.IR /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound .)

Only the
.B init
process may set bits in the capability bounding set;
other than that, the superuser may only clear bits in this set.

On a standard system the capability bounding set always masks out the
.B CAP_SETPCAP
capability.
To remove this restriction, modify the definition of
.B CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
in
.I include/linux/capability.h
and rebuild the kernel.

.SS Current and Future Implementation
A full implementation of capabilities requires:
.IP 1. 4
that for all privileged operations,
the kernel check whether the process has the required
capability in its effective set.
.IP 2. 4
that the kernel provide 
system calls allowing a process's capability sets to
be changed and retrieved.
.IP 3. 4
file system support for attaching capabilities to an executable file,
so that a process gains those capabilities when the file is execed.
.PP
As at Linux 2.6.6, only the first two of these requirements are met.

Eventually, it should be possible to associate three 
capability sets with an executable file, which,
in conjunction with the capability sets of the process,
will determine the capabilities of a process after an
.IR exec :
.TP
.IR Allowed :
this set is ANDed with the process's inherited set to determine which
inherited capabilities are permitted to the process after the exec.
.TP
.IR Forced :
the capabilities automatically permitted to the process,
regardless of the process's inherited capabilities.
.TP
.IR Effective :
those capabilities in the process's new permitted set are
also to be set in the new effective set.
(F(effective) would normally be either all zeroes or all ones.)
.PP
In the meantime, since the current implementation does not
support file capability sets, during an exec:
.IP 1. 4
All three file capability sets are initially assumed to be cleared.
.IP 2. 4
If a set-UID-root program is being execed,
or the real user ID of the process is 0 (root)
then the file allowed and forced sets are defined to be all ones
(i.e., all capabilities set).
.IP 3. 4
If a set-UID-root program is being executed,
then the file effective set is defined to be all ones.
.PP
During an exec, the kernel calculates the new capabilities of
the process using the following algorithm:
.in +4
.nf

P'(permitted) = (P(inherited) & F(allowed)) | (F(forced) & cap_bset)

P'(effective) = P'(permitted) & F(effective)

P'(inherited) = P(inherited)    [i.e., unchanged]

.fi
.in -4
where:
.IP P 10
denotes the value of a process capability set before the exec
.IP P' 10
denotes the value of a capability set after the exec
.IP F 10
denotes a file capability set
.IP cap_bset 10
is the value of the capability bounding set.
.SH NOTES
The
.I libcap
package provides a suite of routines for setting and
getting process capabilities that is more comfortable and less likely
to change than the interface provided by
.BR capset (2)
and
.BR capget (2).
.SH "CONFORMING TO"
No standards govern capabilities, but the Linux capability implementation
is based on the withdrawn POSIX 1003.1e draft standard.
.SH BUGS
There is as yet no file system support allowing capabilities to be
associated with executable files.
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.BR capget (2),
.BR prctl (2)