diff --git a/man4/random.4 b/man4/random.4
index 8609b847e..a070b598c 100644
--- a/man4/random.4
+++ b/man4/random.4
@@ -36,23 +36,26 @@ number of bits of noise in the entropy pool.
 From this entropy pool random numbers are created.
 .LP
 Linux 3.17 and later provides the simpler and safer (see below)
-.BR getrandom(2)
+.BR getrandom (2)
 interface which requires no special files.
 .LP
-When read, the \fI/dev/urandom\fP device return random bytes using a pseudorandom
-number generator seeded from the entropy pool. That operation is
-non-blocking. When used during early boot time, this device may return
+When read, the
+.I /dev/urandom
+device returns random bytes using a pseudorandom
+number generator seeded from the entropy pool.
+That operation is non-blocking.
+When used during early boot time, this device may return
 data prior to the entropy pool being initialized.
 If this is of concern in your application, use
-.BR getrandom(2)
+.BR getrandom (2)
 or \fI/dev/random\fP instead.
 
 .LP
 The \fI/dev/random\fP device is a legacy interface which dates back to
 a time where the cryptographic primitives used in the implementation
-of \fI/dev/urandom\fP were not widely trusted. It will return random bytes
-only within the estimated number of bits of fresh noise in the entropy
-pool, blocking if necessary.
+of \fI/dev/urandom\fP were not widely trusted.
+It will return random bytes only within the estimated number of
+bits of fresh noise in the entropy pool, blocking if necessary.
 \fI/dev/random\fP is suitable for applications that need very
 high quality randomness, and can afford indeterminate delays.
 When the entropy pool is empty, reads from \fI/dev/random\fP will block
@@ -113,9 +116,10 @@ interface is considered a legacy interface, and
 .IR /dev/urandom ,
 is preferred and sufficient in all use cases, with the exception of
 applications which require randomness during early boot time; for
-these applications, the system call
-.BR getrandom(2)
-must be used instead, because will block until the entropy pool is initialized.
+these applications,
+.BR getrandom (2)
+must be used instead,
+because it will block until the entropy pool is initialized.
 
 If a seed file is saved across reboots as recommended below (all major
 Linux distributions have done this since 2000 at least), the output is
@@ -323,9 +327,10 @@ which gets added to the entropy pool.
 .BR RNDZAPENTCNT ", " RNDCLEARPOOL
 Zero the entropy count of all pools and add some system data (such as
 wall clock) to the pools.
-.SH KNOWN ISSUES
-When used during early boot, \fI/dev/urandom\fP may return data prior to the entropy pool being initialized.
-
+.SH BUGS
+When used during early boot,
+.I /dev/urandom
+may return data prior to the entropy pool being initialized.
 .SH FILES
 /dev/random
 .br