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ld.so.8: Document LD_POINTER_GUARD 

Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Petr Baudis 2009-01-12 22:57:06 +13:00 committed by Michael Kerrisk
parent 54eb262054
commit 7b0cacbb10
1 changed files with 12 additions and 12 deletions
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man8/ld.so.8
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@ -256,18 +256,18 @@ For security reasons, since glibc 2.4,
is ignored for set-user-ID/set-group-ID binaries. is ignored for set-user-ID/set-group-ID binaries.
.\" Only used if $ORIGIN can't be determined by normal means .\" Only used if $ORIGIN can't be determined by normal means
.\" (from the origin path saved at load time, or from /proc/self/exe)? .\" (from the origin path saved at load time, or from /proc/self/exe)?
.\" .TP
.\" FIXME .B LD_POINTER_GUARD
.\" Document LD_POINTER_GUARD (glibc since 2.4)
.\" Since glibc 2.4 Set to 0 to disable pointer guarding.
.\" Set to 0 to disable pointer guarding Any other value enables pointer guarding, which is also the default.
.\" Any other value enables pointer guarding, which is also the default. Pointer guarding is a security mechanism whereby some pointers to code
.\" Pointer guarding is a security mechanism(?) to minimize the stored in writable program memory (return addresses saved by
.\" the risk of having usable pointer in the event of a buffer overrun .BR setjmp (3)
.\" or stack smashing attack(?). or function pointers used by various glibc internals) are mangled
.\" http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.gdb.patches/41147/match=ld_pointer_guard semi-randomly to make it more difficult for an attacker to hijack
.\" http://sourceware.org/ml/gdb-patches/2008-04/msg00252.html the pointers for use in the event of a buffer overrun or
.\" http://www.cygwin.com/ml/libc-alpha/2006-01/msg00011.html stack-smashing attack.
.TP .TP
.B LD_PROFILE .B LD_PROFILE
(glibc since 2.1) (glibc since 2.1)